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Abstract
This paper estimates the effects of fiscal institutions on fiscal policy
outcomes, addressing issues related to measurement and endogeneity
in a novel way. Recently developed indices, based on partially ordered
set theory, are used to quantify the stringency of fiscal rules. Iden-
tification of their effects is achieved by exploiting the exogeneity of
institutional variables (checks and balances, government fragmenta-
tion, inflation targeting), which are found to be relevant determinants
of fiscal rules. Our two-stage least squares estimates for (up to) 79
countries over the period 1985-2012 provide strong evidence that coun-
tries with more stringent fiscal rules have higher fiscal balances (lower
deficits), lower interest rate spreads on government bonds, and lower
output volatility.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades, a growing number of countries have introduced or
strengthened fiscal rules to reduce their governments’ deficit bias, increase
confidence in fiscal policy, lower costs of public borrowing, and to ensure the
sustainability of public debt. Yet the effectiveness of fiscal rules in achieving
these goals is still subject to debate, not least because empirical studies on the
effects of fiscal rules are confronted with two major obstacles: measurement
and endogeneity. The present paper addresses both issues in a novel way.
Fiscal rules are typically characterized by numerous properties in terms
of both legislative acts and informal agreements, which are often ordinal
in nature and not comparable with each other. This makes it difficult to
construct a single measure of fiscal rules that can be utilized to estimate
their effects on outcome variables such as the fiscal balance. Previous studies
have used either dummy variables indicating the existence of fiscal rules (e.g.,
Candelon et al., 2010; Gal´ı and Perotti, 2003) or aggregated a subset of the
information on fiscal institutions into one composite index (e.g., ACIR, 1987;
Alesina et al., 1999; Debrun et al., 2008), which involves the assignment of
(cardinal) values and weights to mainly ordinal properties. The unavoidably
high degree of subjectivity involved may explain the partly conflicting results
in the literature, the lack of a widely accepted measure of fiscal rules, and
the absence of a broad agreement on their effects.
In the present paper, we are the first to make use of a novel dataset
by Badinger and Reuter (2015), who employ partially ordered set (POSET)
theory to derive indices of the stringency of fiscal rules for a sample of 81
countries over the period 1985-2012. The virtue of the POSET approach
is that it is well established in the natural and technical sciences, builds
on rigorous mathematical concepts, takes the ordinal nature of the data
seriously, fully exploits the information contained in the data, and reduces
the need for subjective choice to a minimum.
Fiscal rules will typically be endogenous in many empirical applications
of interest, e.g., due to reverse causality since governments may have an
incentive to change fiscal institutions in response to changes in fiscal perfor-
mance (Poterba, 1994). In fact, according to IMF (2009), fiscal conditions
themselves are the best predictors of the likelihood of a country having fis-
cal rules. Moreover, there could be unobserved, omitted variables (such as
voter tastes) affecting both fiscal outcomes and fiscal rules. Finally, even the
most carefully constructed measures of fiscal rules cannot be expected to cap-
ture countries’ fiscal institutions entirely and accurately; as a consequence,
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measures of fiscal rules are likely to be prone to classical measurement error.
Recent studies indicate favorable effects of fiscal rules on fiscal balances
(e.g., Dahan and Strawczynski, 2013; Hallerberg et al., 2009; Fabrizio and
Mody, 2006), interest rates (e.g., Iara and Wolff, 2014), or output volatil-
ity (e.g., Fata´s and Mihov, 2006). Yet in spite of their suggestive findings,
previous studies are subject to some shortcomings. Given the lack of compre-
hensive data on fiscal rules (till recently), most results have been obtained for
a single or a small group of countries; moreover, a large variety of measures
for fiscal rules constructed from different sources (dummies or composite in-
dices) have been used. This makes generalizations and comparisons of the
results difficult. The POSET measures of fiscal rules used in the present
paper, which are derived by Badinger and Reuter (2015) from the recently
released IMF (2012) database, take up these issues by providing commonly
defined measures of the stringency of fiscal rules for a large sample of coun-
tries. Finally, the endogeneity of fiscal rules has not been addressed in a
comprehensive and systematic manner so far. One notable exception is De-
brun et al. (2008), who study the effect of fiscal rules on fiscal policy out-
comes (overall and cyclically adjusted primary balance, debt level); they use
the lagged fiscal rule index and a dummy for the commitment form of fiscal
governance (centralized vs. decentralized) as instruments, but find virtually
no difference between the least squares and instrumental variable estimates.
The present paper considers the effects of fiscal rules on fiscal balances,
government bond interest rate spreads, and output volatility, carefully ad-
dressing endogeneity concerns by first testing for (arguably exogenous) de-
terminants of fiscal rules. In particular, a country’s system of checks and
balances, its government fragmentation, and an indicator variable for infla-
tion targeting regimes turn out to be relevant instruments, which are then
used in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to estimate the effects of
fiscal rules on the aforementioned outcome variables.
Our estimates for a panel of up to 79 countries over the period 1985-2012
yield several interesting results: i) Fiscal rules in fact turn out endogenous.
ii) Countries with more stringent fiscal rules have higher fiscal balances and
lower interest rate spreads on government bonds. iii) Fiscal rules are nega-
tively related to output volatility, although their stabilizing effect material-
izes indirectly by reducing fiscal policy volatility. iv) The 2SLS estimates are
always larger (in magnitude) than the LS estimates; this finding is consis-
tent with endogeneity due to classical measurement error or reverse causality,
where fiscal rules are introduced or strengthened in times of bad fiscal per-
formance.
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2 Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Policy
Several reasons for constraining fiscal policy makers’ discretion by fiscal rules
have been put forward in the literature. The arguments can be grouped
according to incentive structures, creating a deficit bias that results in a
fiscal balance below of what would be socially optimal.
(i) Common pool theory : Many decision makers are involved in the bud-
getary process and each of them may be lobbied by or depend on specific in-
terest groups. As a consequence, the likelihood of spending and large deficits
increases with the number of decision makers. Egger and Koethenbuerger
(2010) find strong evidence for such ‘pork barrel spending’ using German
municipality level data; Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Alesina and Perotti
(1995) document public spending pressures associated with political frag-
mentation for OECD countries.
(ii) Information asymmetry : Decision makers have more information on
the true fiscal position than voters, which can be used for (promising) spend-
ing increases or tax cuts before elections, creating a political business cycle
(see, e.g., Brender and Drazen, 2005; Shi and Svensson, 2006).
(iii) Impatience and short-sightedness : Governments tend to discount fu-
ture events (e.g., future public spending) or future election periods at a higher
rate than voters because politicians may lose their office in the short-run (see,
e.g., Woo, 2005; Van der Ploeg, 1984; Rogoff and Bertelsmann, 2010).
(iv) Political competition: Governments, anticipating the possibility of
being replaced in the future, have an incentive to reduce the room for fiscal
maneuver for future governments by accumulating debt (Persson and Svens-
son, 1989; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990) .
(v) Spillovers and outside pressure: Government on the sub-national level
or in monetary or fiscal unions may fail to internalize all spillover costs (such
as higher interest rates on debt) into their decision making. Moreover, fiscal
policy can interfere with and lead to sub-optimal outcomes of monetary pol-
icy, e.g., in inflation targeting regimes (Dixit and Lambertini, 2003; Combes
et al., 2014).
For all these reasons, unconstrained fiscal policy is likely to result in ex-
cessively high deficits and debt levels, distorted trust, lack of confidence in
the sustainability of public finances, and hence in higher costs of borrow-
ing. While fiscal rules do not eliminate the incentives underlying the deficit
bias, they do limit the room for maneuver of fiscal policy makers and the
opportunities to act in a biased way.
Another rationale for binding the budgetary process, unrelated to the
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deficit bias, has been put forward by Fata´s and Mihov (2003, 2006). They
argue that fiscal constraints lead to lower volatility of discretionary fiscal
policy, lower output volatility and thereby enhanced economic growth, which
may result in a virtuous circle that boosts sustainability (Fata´s and Mihov,
2010).
According to this reasoning and provided that fiscal rules reduce (the
room for exploiting) the deficit bias and fiscal policy volatility, one would ex-
pect fiscal rules to affect fiscal policy outcomes – the more so, the more strin-
gent they are. In particular, countries with more stringent fiscal rules should
have i) a higher fiscal balance (a lower deficit), ii) a smaller risk premium on
government bonds, and iii) lower output volatility. These hypotheses will be
tested in the following.
3 Estimation Framework
For an empirical assessment of the effects of fiscal rules on our outcome
variables of interest, we consider panel data models of the form
yi,t = α + γFRi,t + xi,tβ + µi + εi,t, (1)
where y is the dependent variable, FR is a measure of the stringency of fiscal
rules to be defined below, and x is a vector of control variables; µi denotes
country-fixed effects and εi,t is the idiosyncratic error term. Finally, i is the
cross-section index and t is the time index.
We consider three outcome variables: i) the structural fiscal balance as a
share of potential GDP, ii) the spread on (short-run and long-run) interest
rates of government bonds relative to the US, and iii) output volatility, de-
fined as standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth.1 Before turning
to the estimation results, we discuss our approach to the measurement of
fiscal rules and the identification strategy to estimate their effects.
3.1 Measurement of Fiscal Rules
As measures of the stringency of fiscal rules, we draw on Badinger and Reuter
(2015). They derive indices of the stringency of fiscal rules based on partially
ordered set (POSET) theory, using the IMF (2012) fiscal rules database,
1As outlined below, the regression analysis using output volatility as dependent variable
is based on a cross-section of countries rather than a panel.
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which covers national and supranational numerical fiscal rules in 81 countries
from 1985-2012. It provides information on the type of fiscal rules in place
(balanced budget, debt, expenditure, and revenue rule) and their character-
istics such as legal basis, enforcement mechanisms, coverage, escape clauses,
provisions for cyclical adjustments, and supporting features like independent
monitoring bodies or fiscal responsibility laws.2
From a methodological perspective, the use of POSET indices to quan-
tify the stringency of fiscal rules is an attractive alternative to the composite
index approach mainly used in previous studies. It avoids the assignment
of (cardinal) values to different properties of fiscal frameworks, takes the or-
dinal nature of (most of) the data seriously, fully exploits the information
contained in the data, and reduces the need for subjective choice to a min-
imum. Interestingly, this approach is well established in the natural and
technical sciences but has rarely been used in the social sciences so far. For
a more detailed discussion of how the POSET approach is used to obtain
measures of the stringency of fiscal rules, see Badinger and Reuter (2015).
In the present study, we consider three types of indices describing a coun-
try’s fiscal institutions: i) balanced budget rules (BR), aiming at balancing
the fiscal budget or keeping it within certain boundaries, ii) debt rules (DR),
aiming at stabilizing or reducing the level of public debt, and iii) an index
relating to general fiscal institutions (GI), indicating the existence of multi-
year frameworks, of independent bodies setting assumptions as well as laws
on monitoring performance, transparency, and accountability.
Although it is possible (and in fact the case for several countries) to have
more than one fiscal rule in place, we include only one index at a time in the
estimation to avoid collinearity issues. (The average correlation between the
fiscal rule indices amounts to 0.783.) Hence, Equation (1) will be estimated
separately for each of the three indices of fiscal rules.
Note that each fiscal rule index ranges from 0 to 1 and is increasing
in stringency, broadly defined in terms of the hierarchy of the legal basis,
coverage, transparency, and accountability. Summary statistics of the fiscal
rule indices are given in Table A2 in the Appendix.
2The IMF database documents the increase in the use of fiscal rules over the last decades;
whereas only 5% of the 81 countries covered had fiscal rules in place in 1985, this share
has increased to 15% in 1995 and 56% in 2012.
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3.2 Identification: Determinants of Fiscal Rules
There are several empirical studies pointing to economic, political, and in-
stitutional determinants of fiscal institutions (e.g. IMF, 2009; Caldero´n and
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2008; Elbadawi et al., 2011). In the present context, our
goal is not to derive and estimate a comprehensive, well-specified model of
the determinants of fiscal rules. Rather we aim at obtaining a small set of
instrumental variables for fiscal rules, which are relevant and valid in the
context of Equation (1).
Obviously, this rules out fiscal outcome variables such as the fiscal bal-
ance, which is one of our dependent variables, or control variables (x) in-
cluded in Equation (1) such as the debt-to-GDP ratio or GDP per capita.
Given the lack of a choice theory on why governments introduce (strengthen)
fiscal rules, we pursue an empirical search strategy to motivate our selection
of instruments. Thereby, we confine ourselves to a set of institutional vari-
ables that are plausibly exogenous and have been argued and empirically
shown to be related to fiscal rules. In particular, we consider government
confidence, government ideology, government ideological range, government
fragmentation, government stability, inflation targeting, and parliamentary
dispersion. Table A1 in the Appendix gives a description of the variables
and data sources.
Starting with a comprehensive model for fiscal rules including all vari-
ables, we proceed with a general-to-specific approach and eliminate sequen-
tially insignificant variables according to their p-values.3 Following the results
from this approach, we choose three instruments for the stringency of fiscal
rules: checks and balances (CB), government fragmentation (GF ), and in-
flation targeting (IT ).4 Table 1 shows the regression results for the final set
of variables.
– Table 1 –
The variables suggested by our empirical search strategy (and the sign of
their coefficients) are backed by theoretical arguments. A tight system of
political checks and balances (other than fiscal constraints) may be viewed
3We base our search strategy on the model with balanced budget rules (BR) as dependent
variable; since the use of DR or GI yields essentially identical results, we use the same
set of instruments for each of the three variables (BR,DR and GI).
4Government size and government stability also turned out to be robust determinants of
fiscal rules, but their inclusion as instruments in the two-stage least squares estimation
of Equation (1) leads to a rejection of instrument validity.
7
as implicit contract between governments and voters that reduces the need
for fiscal rules (Debrun and Kumar, 2007). Political fragmentation typically
leads to public spending pressures (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Velasco, 2000;
Volkerink and de Haan, 2001; Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002; Besley and
Case, 2003), creating incentives for voters and governments to establish or
strengthen fiscal rules to countervail these pressures.
The finding that inflation targeting regimes are conducive to the exis-
tence of stringent fiscal rules has a strong theoretical foundation; it is con-
sistent with a series of papers that show theoretically and provide evidence
that inflation targeting works better when accompanied by fiscal discipline
through fiscal rules (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1997; Dixit and Lambertini,
2003; Castellani and Debrun, 2005; Combes et al., 2014). Accordingly, one
would expect countries with inflation targeting regimes to have more strin-
gent fiscal rules in place.
All three variables (CB,GF, IT ) are highly significant for each type of
fiscal rule (BR,DR,GI) and hence likely to serve as relevant instruments in
Equation (1). Moreover, there is no strong reason to assume that a country’s
system of checks and balances or the fragmentation of its government are
prone to a reverse causality issue; and the strict separation between monetary
and fiscal policy in most countries makes it very unlikely that the presence
of an inflation targeting regime is systematically (and directly) related to
fiscal policy outcomes (through channels other than fiscal rules). We will
consider this point further by testing for overidentifying restrictions and using
alternative subsets of instruments in the robustness analysis.
4 Estimation Results
We next report the least squares (LS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS)
panel data estimates of Equation (1), using as dependent variable the struc-
tural fiscal balance (Section 4.1) and the spreads on the interest rates of
government bonds (Section 4.2), followed by a robustness analysis (Section
4.3). We then turn to the estimation of the effects of fiscal rules on output
volatility in Section 4.4, using a cross-section version of Equation (1). A
description of the variables used in the estimation and summary statistics
are provided in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix.
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4.1 Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Balances
The upper panel of Table 2 presents the LS and 2SLS estimates of the speci-
fication in Equation (1) for the structural fiscal balance without control vari-
ables. The lower panel shows the corresponding results including as standard
controls the debt-to-GDP ratio along with real GDP growth and an indicator
variable taking a value of one for election years. As outlined above, three vari-
ables are used as instruments for fiscal rules in the 2SLS estimation: checks
and balances (CB), government fragmentation (GF ), and inflation target-
ing (IT ). All estimates in Table 2 are based on an unbalanced panel of 47
countries over the period 1985-2012 (785 observations), which is determined
by data availability.
Notice first that for all specifications, both the LS and 2SLS estimates
yield significant effects of the control variables with the expected sign. A
high level of debt is associated with a lower structural fiscal balance, whereas
high GDP growth has a positive effect. In election years fiscal performance
is systematically worse, pointing to the relevance of political business cycles.
– Table 2 –
Turning to the effect of fiscal rules on the fiscal balance, several results are
worth noting. For both specifications (with and without controls) and for
all three types of fiscal rules (BR,DR,GI), it holds that: i) The Hausman
test clearly rejects the null of exogeneity, necessitating the use of a 2SLS
approach. ii) The 2SLS estimates are always larger than the LS estimates,
a result that is consistent with endogeneity due to classical measurement
error or negative reverse causality, where a deterioration of the fiscal balance
triggers the introduction or strengthening of fiscal rules.5 iii) The 2SLS
estimates are all significant and point to a positive effect of fiscal rules on
fiscal performance in terms of the fiscal balance. iv) Instrument validity
is never rejected by the tests for overidentifying restrictions (OID); this is
supportive to our choice of instruments and does not indicate the presence
of correlation with unobserved variables affecting fiscal rules and the fiscal
balance (such as voter tastes, ideology).
Also notice that the 2SLS estimates hardly change when the control vari-
ables are added, i.e, the instruments appear to produce reliable estimates
5If there is a simultaneous effect of the fiscal balance on the fiscal rule amounting to ρ,
the partial covariance between the respective fiscal rule and the error term in Equation
(1) has the sign of the expression ρ/(1−γρ); assuming that (1−γρ) is greater than zero,
a downward bias of the LS estimates implies that ρ is negative.
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even in the simple regression model (as it is also suggested by the insignifi-
cant OID tests). Instrument quality, judged by the F -statistic on excluding
the instruments from the first-stage regression, is fine with values above 20.
In sum, the evidence for a positive effect of fiscal rules on the fiscal balance
is quite strong.
In terms of magnitude, note that the indices of fiscal rules range from
0 to 1. E.g., for balanced budget rules (BR), the estimates imply that a
one standard deviation increase in BR (0.409) leads to an improvement of
the fiscal balance by 1.493 percentage points or 0.436 standard deviations.
The corresponding standardized (beta) coefficients of DR and GI amount to
0.400 and 0.336, respectively.
4.2 Fiscal Rules and Government Bond Spreads
Table 3 shows the LS and 2SLS estimates of Equation (1) using as dependent
variable the spreads of short-run and long-run interest rates on government
bonds relative to the US. In line with Iara and Wolff (2014), three control
variables are included: the structural fiscal balance, the debt-to-GDP ratio,
and a composite risk term, which is proxied by the (log of the) Chicago Board
Options Exchange Market volatility index. The panels over the period 1985-
2012, for which data on all variables is available, comprises 30 countries
(short-run spreads) and 36 countries (long-run spreads), respectively.
Considering the results for the control variables firsts, for both short-
run and long-run interest rates on government bonds, a higher fiscal balance
(lower deficit) is associated with a smaller spread. For long-run spreads, the
debt-to-GDP ratio is positive and significant as expected; this does not hold
for short-run spreads, where its effect is insignificant or negative. The latter
result is difficult to interpret; it could be due to sampling variation or by
omitted determinants of short-run spreads related to the debt level. Finally,
general risk measured by the volatility index drives up interest rate spreads,
in particular in the short-run.
– Table 3 –
The negative effect of the budget balance on interest rate spreads reported in
Table 3, together with the positive effect of fiscal rules on the fiscal balance
obtained in Section 4.1 (Table 2), imply that fiscal rules indirectly lower
interest rate spreads by improving the fiscal balance.
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As to the direct effect of fiscal rules on interest rate spreads, operating
trough channels other than the fiscal balance such as increased trust and
credibility of fiscal policy, the following results are common to all types of
fiscal rules: i) The Hausman tests show strong evidence for the endogeneity
of fiscal rules, whereas the OID tests do not point to a problem regarding
instrument validity; instrument quality is fine with F -statistics around 20
or larger. ii) The 2SLS estimates indicate a negative effect of fiscal rules
on government bond interest rate spreads and are much larger in magnitude
than the LS estimates. The fact that the LS estimates are upward biased
(downward biased in magnitude) points to the relevance of measurement
error and is consistent with endogeneity due to positive reserve causality.
Hence, as in Section 4.1, these results can be interpreted as evidence that
policy makers respond to downturns, i.e., an increase in interest rate spreads
(a deterioration of the fiscal balance), by introducing or strengthening fiscal
rules.
In terms of magnitude, the effect of fiscal rules is also economically sig-
nificant; e.g., for balanced budget rules (BR), the estimates imply that a one
standard deviation increase in BR (0.406) leads to a reduction in short-run
(long-run) spreads by 3.887 (1.758) percentage points or 0.875 (0.678) stan-
dard deviations. The standardized coefficients of DR and GI are -0.736 and
-0.634 (short-run) and -0.906 and -0.573 (long-run). Hence, in terms of beta
coefficients, the effects on short-run and long-run spreads are of the same
magnitude.
4.3 Robustness
We next turn to a robustness analysis of the effects of balanced budget rules
(BR) and the general fiscal framework (GI) on the three outcome variables
considered so far. The results for debt rules (DR) are very similar and not
shown for the sake of brevity.
Table 4 reports the estimates of the baseline models in Tables 2 and 3,
along with four variations. To ensure that our results are not driven by
a few ‘extreme’ data points, we exclude i) outliers, defined as observations
with standardized residuals greater than two, and ii) observations, where
the (absolute value of the) dependent variable exceeds twice its standard
deviation, i.e., 7% for fiscal balances, and 9% and 5% for short-run and long-
run spreads, respectively. Overall, the estimates effects of fiscal rules become
somewhat smaller in magnitude, but the precision of the estimates improves
and the coefficients remain statistically significant in all specifications.
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We next consider alternative identification strategies for the effects of fis-
cal rules. In the baseline specification, three instruments are used for fiscal
rules: checks and balances (CB), government fragmentation (GF ), and infla-
tion targeting (IT ). We re-estimate the baseline model, using two subsets of
the instruments: i) inflation targeting (IT ), and ii) the two institutional vari-
ables (CB,GF ). Notice that inflation targeting is not only the instrument
best motivated theoretically; it also turns out to be the strongest instrument
empirically, showing by far the largest F -statistics in the first-stage regres-
sion. The estimated effects of fiscal rules, using IT as instrument, are very
similar to those in the baseline model and all of them remain significant at
1%.
Using as instruments the two institutional variables (CB,GF ) only, in-
strument quality becomes weaker and the results differ across the dependent
variables. For the short-run interest rate spreads, all results hold up (though
the estimates become less precise). For long-run interest rate spreads the
coefficient of BR is rendered insignificant with a p-value of 0.113, the coef-
ficient of GI remains significant at 10%; compared with the baseline model,
these changes are due to less precise parameter estimates due to the weaker
instruments and a reduction in the magnitude of the estimated effect.
For the fiscal balance, the outcome is similar. The coefficients of BR
and GI become smaller and their standard errors larger, such that they are
rendered insignificant with p-values of 0.217 and 0.132, respectively. Again,
this appears to be a matter of instrument quality, as evident from the drop
in the F -statistics relative to the baseline model. We address this issue
by adding another institutional variable, government confidence (GC), as
further instrument. This improves instrument quality and both BR and GI
turn out significant at 1%. The drawback of this approach is that data on
the variable GC is available for a much smaller number of countries and time
periods, resulting in a sample of only 215 observations.6
Hence, with very few exceptions, which appear to be a matter of instru-
ment quality, our results obtained so far hold up for different samples and
different identification strategies: Stringent fiscal rules improve the fiscal
balance and lower interest rate spreads on government bonds.
6We add that BR and GI do not become significant due to the change in the sample;
also in the reduced sample, they would be insignificant without using GC as additional
instrument. Apart from data availability, GC was not chosen as instrument in the first
place, since – with inflation targeting included – it does not add to instrument quality.
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4.4 Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Policy, and Output Volatility
As a final point, we consider the relation between fiscal rules, fiscal volatil-
ity, and output volatility. Output volatility (σY ) is measured as standard
deviation of GDP per capita growth, fiscal policy volatility (σFP ) as stan-
dard deviation of the growth of real government expenditures over the period
1985-2012.7 Accordingly, we obtain a cross-sectional data set of 74 countries,
where the variables are volatilities or averages over the period 1985-2012.
Fiscal Rules and Output Volatility
Relating output volatility to fiscal rules directly, the first column in Table 5
reports a weakly significant, negative effect of balanced budget rules (BR)
on output volatility obtained by 2SLS estimation, using our standard set of
instruments (CB,GF, IT ). GDP per capita is included as control variable to
account for the level of development and as a proxy for institutional quality.
However, as shown in second column, once we add fiscal policy volatility
to the model, which has been shown to be an important determinant of
output volatility by Fata´s and Mihov (2003), the variable (BR) becomes
insignificant. This holds true for the other types of fiscal rules (DR,GI) as
well, and also when the model is estimated by LS. Hence, we conclude that
fiscal rules do not have a direct effect on output volatility, once fiscal policy
volatility is controlled for.
As a consequence, we proceed with a specification relating output volatil-
ity to fiscal policy volatility. As argued by Fata´s and Mihov (2003), fis-
cal policy volatility has to be considered potentially endogenous in such a
specification; they use institutional variables (number of elections, political
constraints, majoritarian/presidential system) as instruments. We pursue a
similar approach here, using our measures of fiscal rules as instruments for
fiscal policy volatility. The first-stage regression of fiscal volatility on fiscal
rules is then informative of a possible indirect effect of fiscal rules on output
volatility through fiscal policy volatility.
– Table 5 –
Fiscal Policy Volatility and Output Volatility
7We do not partial out cyclical movements in fiscal policy, since we are interested in
the effects of fiscal volatility, stemming from all changes in the fiscal stance (related or
unrelated to the cycle), but we will consider an alternative, cyclically adjusted measure
of fiscal policy volatility below.
13
The third column in Table 5 shows the results using balanced budget rules
as instrument. As expected we find a significant positive effect of fiscal
policy volatility on output volatility. The fourth column re-runs this regres-
sion, using as alternative instruments our three institutional variables: checks
and balances (CB), government fragmentation (GF ), and inflation targeting
(IT ). Again we find a positive effect, confirming the results by Fata´s and Mi-
hov (2003) using different sets of instruments. With an elasticity of around
one, also the magnitude of the estimated effect of fiscal policy volatility is in
line with their findings.
When debt rules are used as instrument, we still find a positive coeffi-
cient for fiscal policy volatility, but due to the poor instrument quality (the
F -statistic in the first-stage regression amounts to 0.4), it is rendered in-
significant. Using the general framework (GI) as instrument (which is the
strongest instrument in the present context with an F -statistic of 8.4), the
effect of fiscal policy volatility turns out significant at 1% again.
The final column confirms these findings for an alternative measure of
fiscal policy volatility, calculated as standard deviation of the residuals from
a time series regression (for each country) of the growth of government ex-
penditures on output growth (to partial out cyclical effects).8 The results are
very similar to those using as dependent variable the the ‘gross’ measure of
fiscal policy volatility, which is not too surprising given the high correlation
between the two variables (0.896).
Overall, it should be pointed out that instrument quality is unsatisfactory
in the regressions in the upper panel of Table 5. However, taken together
with the results from previous studies (Fata´s and Mihov, 2003), we find the
evidence for a positive effect of fiscal policy volatility on output volatility to
be quite strong. We next consider whether fiscal rules have an indirect effect
on output volatility through their (direct) effect on fiscal policy volatility.
Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Policy Volatility
The middle panel of Table 5 shows, for all specifications using fiscal rules
as instrument for fiscal volatility (in the upper panel), the corresponding
first-stage regressions of fiscal policy volatility on GDP per capita and the
respective fiscal rule. All three fiscal rules show a negative coefficient, sug-
gesting that more stringent fiscal rules are associated with lower fiscal policy
8Specifically, the equation is ∆ ln(Gi,t) = αi + βi∆ ln(Yi,t) + γi ln(Gi,t−1) + εi,t, where G
denotes real government expenditures and Y is real GDP. It is estimated by 2SLS using
three lags of output growth, i.e., ∆ ln(Yi,t−1), ∆ ln(Yi,t−2) and ∆ ln(Yi,t−3) as instruments
for ∆ ln(Yi,t).
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volatility, and hence also less output volatility. Balanced budget rules (BR)
and the general framework (GI) turn out statistically significant as well,
whereas the coefficient of DR is insignificant.
These findings of a negative indirect effect of fiscal rules on output volatil-
ity, materializing through a reduction in fiscal policy volatility, is consistent
with the negative direct effect of fiscal rules on output volatility, which is
rendered insignificant once fiscal policy volatility is accounted for (Table 5,
upper panel, second column).
The regressions of fiscal policy volatility on fiscal rules in the middle panel
are estimated by LS, which is the natural choice when they are viewed as
first-stage regressions of the models for output volatility in the upper panel.
In the following, we consider two-stage least squares estimates of fiscal policy
volatility on fiscal rules to address potential endogeneity concerns, given that
fiscal volatility is an outcome variable of fiscal policy (as are the fiscal balance
and interest rate spreads in Sections 4.1 and 4.2).
The lower panel of Table 5 shows the 2SLS estimates using our standard
instruments (CB,GF, IT ). The results are close to the LS estimates in terms
of statistical significance, whereas the effects of fiscal rules become larger in
magnitude. However, the difference between LS and 2SLS estimates is not
significant; in stark contrast to the models for fiscal balances and interest
rate spreads, the Hausman test never rejects the null of exogeneity of fiscal
rules. This is not implausible; compared with the other outcome variables
considered, fiscal policy volatility is a much less reported and debated in-
dicator of fiscal policy, making it unlikely that policy makers introduce or
strengthen fiscal rules in response to changes in fiscal policy volatility.
Summing up, we find that stringent balanced budget rules and a stringent
general fiscal framework have a dampening effect on output volatility, which
materializes indirectly through a reduction of fiscal policy volatility.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides an empirical assessment of the effects of fiscal rules on
macroeconomic outcomes (budget balance, interest rate spreads, and output
volatility) for a sample of up to 79 countries over the period 1985-2012. For
an improved measurement of fiscal rules we use indices of the stringency of
balanced budget rules, debt rules, and of the general fiscal framework, which
are based on partially ordered set theory and derived by Badinger and Reuter
(2015). For identification of the effects of (endogenous) fiscal rules, we employ
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a two-stage least squares procedure, using institutional variables (checks and
balances, government fragmentation, inflation targeting) as instruments.
We find that countries with more stringent fiscal rules have higher fiscal
balances and lower interest rate spreads on government bonds. Moreover, fis-
cal rules are negatively related to output volatility, where this effect is chan-
neled through a reduction in fiscal policy volatility (which is confirmed to be
an important determinant of output volatility). The institutional variables
turn out as relevant instruments of satisfactory quality; tests for overidenti-
fying restrictions indicate no problems with instrument validity.
The differences between the least squares and two-stage least squares
estimates are sizable and statistically significant, pointing to the importance
of addressing the endogeneity of fiscal rules in empirical studies on their
effects. Our finding that the least squares estimates are downward biased
(in magnitude) in all models is consistent with endogeneity due to classical
measurement error or a reverse causality relationship, where fiscal rules are
introduced or strengthened when fiscal performance deteriorates, e.g., when
fiscal balances go down or interest rate spreads go up.
Overall, our results make a strong case for the use of fiscal rules to im-
prove fiscal policy (and thereby macroeconomic) outcomes. To make this
policy conclusion operational, more research is warranted to identify which
features of fiscal rules are crucial and which ones are less relevant and can
be dispensed with. Dissecting fiscal rules and their effects in such a way
would provide important information on how to design effective fiscal rules,
ensuring sustainable fiscal policy, low costs of government borrowing, and low
output volatility, while at the same time allowing for the required flexibility
to respond to large shocks.
16
References
ACIR (1987), Fiscal discipline in the federal system: National reform and
the experience of the states. Washington, D.C., Advisory Council on In-
tergovernmental Relations.
Alesina, A., Hausmann, R., Hommes, R. and Stein, E. (1999), ‘Budget insti-
tutions and fiscal performance in Latin America’, Journal of Development
Economics 59, 253–273.
Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1995), ‘Fiscal expansions and adjustments in
OCED countries’, Economic Policy 10, 207–248.
Alesina, A. and Tabellini, G. (1990), ‘A positive theory of fiscal deficits and
government debt’, Review of Economic Studies 57, 403–14.
Badinger, H. and Reuter, W. (2015), ‘Measurement of fiscal rules: Introduc-
ing the application of partially ordered set (POSET) theory’, Journal of
Macroeconomics 43, 108–123.
Beetsma, R. and Bovenberg, A. L. (1997), ‘Designing fiscal and monetary
institutions in a second-best world’, European Journal of Political Economy
13, 53–79.
Besley, T. and Case, A. (2003), ‘Political institutions and policy choices: Evi-
dence from the United States’, Journal of Economic Literature 41(1), 7–73.
Brender, A. and Drazen, A. (2005), ‘Political budget cycles in new versus
established democracies’, Journal of Monetary Economics 52(7), 1271–
1295.
Caldero´n, C. and Schmidt-Hebbel, K. (2008), The choice of fiscal regime in
the world. Central Bank of Chile Working Paper.
Candelon, B., Muysken, J. and Vermeulen, R. (2010), ‘Fiscal policy and
monetary integration in Europe: An update’, Oxford Economic Papers
62, 323–349.
Castellani, F. and Debrun, X. (2005), ‘Designing macroeconomic frameworks:
a positive analysis of monetary and fiscal delegation’, International Fi-
nances 8, 87–117.
17
Combes, J., X. Debrun, A. and Tapsoba, R. (2014), ‘Inflation targeting and
fiscal rules: Do interactions and sequencing matter?’, IMF Working Paper,
14/89 .
Dahan, M. and Strawczynski, M. (2013), ‘Fiscal rules and the composition of
government expenditures in OECD countries’, Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management 32(3), 484–504.
Debrun, X. and Kumar, M. S. (2007), The discipline-enhancing role of fiscal
institutions: Theory and empirical evidence. IMF Working Paper 07/171.
Debrun, X., Moulin, L., Turrini, A., Ayuso-i Casals, J. and Kumar, M.
(2008), ‘Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union’,
Economic Policy 23(54), 297–362.
Dixit, A. and Lambertini, L. (2003), ‘Interaction of commitment and discre-
tion in monetary and fiscal policies’, Journal of Macroeconomics 43, 1522–
42.
Egger, P. and Koethenbuerger, M. (2010), ‘Government spending and legisla-
tive organization: quasi-experimental evidence from germany’, American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2(4), 200–212.
Elbadawi, I., Schmidt-Hebbel, K. and Soto, R. (2011), Why do countries
have fiscal rules? Catholic University of Chile Conference on ”Economic
Policy in Emerging Economies”.
Fabrizio, S. and Mody, A. (2006), ‘Can budget institutions counteract polit-
ical indiscipline?’, Economic Policy 21(48), 689–739.
Fata´s, A. and Mihov, I. (2003), ‘The case for restricting fiscal policy discre-
tion’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 4, 1419–1448.
Fata´s, A. and Mihov, I. (2006), ‘The macroeconomic effects of fiscal rules in
the US states’, Journal of Public Economics 90(1-2), 101–117.
Fata´s, A. and Mihov, I. (2010), Fiscal policy at a crossroads: The need for
constrained discretion, in R. Baldwin, D. Gros and L. Laeven, eds, ‘Com-
pleting the Eurozone Rescue: What more needs to be done? A VoxEU.org
publication’, Center for European Policy Research, pp. 69–73.
Gal´ı, J. and Perotti, R. (2003), ‘Fiscal policy and monetary integration in
Europe’, Economic Policy 18(37), 533–72.
18
Hallerberg, M., Strauch, R. and von Hagen, J. (2009), Fiscal Governance in
Europe, Cambridge University Press.
Hammond, G. (2012), State of the Art of Inflation Targeting - 2012, CCBS
Handbook No. 29, Bank of England.
Iara, A. and Wolff, G. B. (2014), ‘Rules and risk in the euro area’, European
Journal of Political Economy 34, 222–236.
IMF (2009), Fiscal Rules Anchoring Expectations for Sustainable Public Fi-
nances. International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department.
IMF (2012), Fiscal Rules Dataset, 1985-2012. International Monetary Fund,
Fiscal Affairs Department.
Perotti, R. and Kontopoulos, Y. (2002), ‘Fragmented fiscal policy’, Journal
of Public Economics 86, 199–222.
Persson, T. and Svensson, L. (1989), ‘Why a stubborn conservative would
run a deficit: policy with time-inconsistent preferences’, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 104, 325–45.
Poterba, J. (1994), ‘State responses to fiscal crises: The effects of budgetary
institutions and politics’, Journal of Political Economy 102, 799–821.
Rae, D. W. (1971), The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, New Haven
London, Yale University Press.
Rogoff, K. and Bertelsmann, J. (2010), The rationale for fiscal policy coun-
cils: Theory and evidence. Paper presented at the Conference on Indepen-
dent Fiscal Institutions, 18-19 March, Fiscal Council Republic of Hungary,
Budapest.
Roubini, N. and Sachs, J. (1989), ‘Political and economic determinants
of budget deficits in industrial democracies’, European Economic Review
33, 903–938.
Shi, M. and Svensson, J. (2006), ‘Political budget cycles: Do they differ
across countries and why?’, Journal of Public Economics 90, 1367–1389.
Van der Ploeg, F. (1984), ‘Government ideology and re-election efforts’, Ox-
ford Economic Papers 36(2), 213–231.
19
Velasco, A. (2000), ‘Debts and deficits with fragmented fiscal policy making’,
Journal of Public Economics 76(1), 105–125.
Volkerink, B. and de Haan, J. D. (2001), ‘Fragmented government effects on
fiscal policy: New evidence’, Public Choice 109, 221–242.
Woo, J. (2005), ‘Social polarization, fiscal instability and growth’, European
Economic Review 49(6), 1451–1477.
20
Appendix
Table A1: Variables and Data Sources
Variable Description Source
Balanced budget rule (BR) POSET index of stringency of balanced budget rule B/R
Checks and balances (CB) Political Constraints - measure of the institutional
constraints faced by authorities
WB, DPI
Debt/GDP General government gross debt in percent of GDP IMF, WEO
Debt rule (DR) POSET index of stringency of debt rule B/R
Election 1 in year with election of legislative, 0 otherwise WB, DPI
Fiscal balance General government structural balance, percent of
potential GDP
IMF, WEO
Fiscal policy volatility (σFP ) st.dev. of growth rate of government expenditures IMF, WEO
GDP growth Real GDP growth (Percentage change) IMF, WEO
GDP per capita (GDPPC) PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Chain Series), at
2005 constant prices
PWT 8.1
General fiscal framework (GI) POSET index of general fiscal framework B/R
Government confidence (GC) Popular confidence in government World Values Sur-
vey
Government fragmentation (GF ) Rae (1971) fractionalisation index 1−∑Ni=1 p2i where




Government ideology Degree of political conservatism, between 0 (left-
wing) and 8 (rightwing)
Own calculations
with WB, DPI
Government ideological range Difference between the two extreme ideological
scores of parties in coalition governments
Own calculations
with WB, DPI
Government stability Term length of governments Own calculations
with WB, DPI
Inflation targeting (IT ) 1 if central bank operates with inflation targeting Hammond (2012)
Long-run spread Interest rate on government bond relative to US IMF, IFS
Output volatility (σY ) st.dev. of growth rate of GDP per capita PWT 8.1
Parliamentary dispersion Dispersion of political parties: sum of squared seat
fractions of parties in parliament
Own calculations
with WB, DPI
Risk Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Options
and Futures Volatility Index
CBOE
Short-run spread Interest rate on treasury bills relative to US IMF, IFS
Notes: Abbreviations: IMF . . . International Monetary Fund, WEO . . . World Economic Outlook, IFS
. . . International Financial Statistics, PWT . . . Penn World Tables, WB . . . World Bank, DPI . . . Database
of Political Institutions, B/R . . . Badinger and Reuter (2015).
Table A2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
Panel data
Balanced budget rule (BR) 0.300 0.001 0.409 0.000 1.000
Checks and balances (CB) 4.046 4.000 1.066 2.000 8.000
Debt/GDP 57.150 50.859 33.511 3.894 236.564
Debt rule (DR) 0.188 0.001 0.364 0.000 1.000
Election 0.280 0.000 0.449 0.000 1.000
Fiscal balance −2.618 −2.513 3.423 −19.106 8.189
GDP growth 2.792 2.930 3.151 −17.729 12.113
General fiscal framework (GI) 0.299 0.331 0.311 0.000 0.989
Government fragmentation (GF ) 0.796 0.805 0.101 0.241 0.986
Inflation targeting (IT ) 0.321 0.000 0.467 0.000 1.000
Long-run spread 0.927 0.375 2.593 −4.698 20.696
Risk 21.349 21.680 39.450 11.460 7.389
Short-run spread 2.635 1.557 4.444 −5.139 21.092
Cross-section
Balanced budget rule (BR) 0.164 0.004 0.225 0.000 0.800
Checks and balances (CB) 3.396 3.457 1.093 1.000 6.036
Debt rule (DR) 0.094 0.001 0.169 0.000 0.666
Fiscal policy volatility (σFP ) 0.083 0.061 0.070 0.013 0.356
GDP per capita (GDPPC) (1,000) 14.255 10.280 12.692 0.531 57.502
General fiscal framework (GI) 0.157 0.142 0.155 0.000 0.585
Government fragmentation (GF ) 0.675 0.737 0.178 0.148 0.909
Inflation targeting (IT ) 0.136 0.000 0.249 0.000 0.857
Output volatility (σY ) 0.044 0.037 0.037 0.014 0.313
Notes: Panel data statistics based on the 785 observations in Table 2, except for the
long-run spread and risk (604 observations, see Table 3) and the short-run spread (477
observations, see Table 3). Statistics in lower section based on cross-section of 74
countries (see Table 5).
Table 1: Determinants of Fiscal Rules: LS Estimates
BR BR BR BR DR GI
Checks and balances (CB) 0.013∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Gov. fragmentation (GF ) 0.163∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.028) (0.028) (0.023)
Inflation targeting (IT ) 0.324∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.022) (0.018)
R2 0.481 0.488 0.534 0.537 0.494 0.499
SEE 0.250 0.248 0.237 0.236 0.195 0.190
Notes: All specifications include country-fixed effects and are estimated for an unbalanced
panel of 71 countries over the period 1985-2012 (1922 observations). Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 per-
cent. Dependent variables: BR. . . balanced budget rule, DR. . . debt rule, GI. . . general fiscal
framework.
Table 2: Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Balances: LS and 2SLS Estimates
BR DR GI
Simple model LS 2SLS LS 2SLS LS 2SLS
Fiscal rule 1.282∗∗∗ 3.520∗∗∗ 1.218∗∗∗ 3.818∗∗∗ 1.421∗∗∗ 3.595∗∗∗
(0.321) (1.158) (0.308) (1.358) (0.399) (1.154)
Hausman (0.032) (0.029) (0.033)
OID (0.528) (0.757) (0.778)
IQual 24.313 31.318 20.504
R2 0.546 0.520 0.543 0.517 0.545 0.527
SEE 2.378 2.457 2.388 2.46 2.383 2.432
BR DR GI
With controls LS 2SLS LS 2SLS LS 2SLS
Fiscal rule 1.201∗∗∗ 3.652∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 3.720∗∗∗ 1.584∗∗∗ 3.697∗∗∗
(0.292) (1.064) (0.289) (1.265) (0.354) (1.037)
Debt/GDP −0.027∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
GDP growth 0.231∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034)
Election −0.314∗ −0.322∗ −0.317∗ −0.338∗ −0.311∗ −0.312∗
(0.181) (0.189) (0.182) (0.190) (0.180) (0.184)
Hausman (0.009) (0.012) (0.021)
OID (0.488) (0.308) (0.584)
IQual 24.317 33.213 39.358
R2 0.610 0.578 0.605 0.576 0.611 0.595
SEE 2.210 2.311 2.224 2.310 2.206 2.256
Notes: Dependent variable is the structural fiscal balance as a share of potential
GDP in %. All specifications include country-fixed effects and are estimated for
an unbalanced panel of 47 countries over the period 1985-2012 (785 observations).
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance
at 10, 5, and 1 percent. 2SLS estimates use checks and balances (CB), government
fragmentation (GF ), and inflation targeting (IT ) as instruments for the respective
fiscal rule; p-values for heteroskedasticity-robust Hausman test and heteroskedasticity-
robust test for overidentifying restrictions (OID) in parenthesis. IQual denotes in-
strument quality and reports the F -statistic of excluding the instruments from the
first-stage regression. The R2 is calculated as squared correlation between actual and
predicted values.
Table 3: Fiscal Rules and Interest Rate Spreads: LS and 2SLS Estimates
BR DR GI
Short-run spread LS 2SLS LS 2SLS LS 2SLS
Fiscal rule −1.426∗∗∗ −9.566∗∗∗ −1.985∗∗∗ −8.457∗∗∗ −0.964∗ −9.261∗∗∗
(0.428) (2.065) (0.688) (1.976) (0.532) (2.033)
Fiscal balance −0.448∗∗∗ −0.318∗∗∗ −0.452∗∗∗ −0.392∗∗∗ −0.454∗∗∗ −0.312∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.081) (0.068) (0.071) (0.069) (0.080)
Debt/GDP −0.029∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗ −0.023∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Risk 0.867∗∗ 0.955∗ 0.912∗∗ 1.108∗∗ 0.874∗∗ 1.069∗∗
(0.397) (0.500) (0.394) (0.445) (0.401) (0.493)
Hausman (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OID (0.928) (0.060) (0.258)
IQual 19.380 28.755 26.522
R2 0.599 0.439 0.601 0.517 0.594 0.456
SEE 2.918 3.729 2.908 3.291 2.937 3.566
BR DR GI
Long-run spread LS 2SLS LS 2SLS LS 2SLS
Fiscal rule −0.847∗∗∗ −4.353∗∗∗ −0.636∗∗ −6.606∗∗∗ −0.993∗∗∗ −4.750∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.956) (0.312) (1.726) (0.284) (1.064)
Fiscal balance −0.122∗∗ −0.060 −0.133∗∗ −0.093 −0.121∗∗ −0.060
(0.056) (0.058) (0.056) (0.059) (0.057) (0.057)
Debt/GDP 0.032∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Risk 0.328 0.445∗ 0.303 0.325 0.329 0.439∗
(0.206) (0.238) (0.205) (0.247) (0.206) (0.234)
Hausman (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OID (0.201) (0.261) (0.174)
IQual 30.417 21.545 38.159
R2 0.559 0.467 0.555 0.412 0.559 0.482
SEE 1.780 2.016 1.790 2.168 1.780 1.972
Notes: Dependent variable is short-run interest rate spread (upper panel) and long-
run interest rate spread on government bonds (lower panel). All specifications in-
clude country-fixed effects; upper panel: 30 countries, 1985-2012 (477 observations);
lower panel: 36 countries, 1985-2012 (604 observations). Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 per-
cent. 2SLS estimates use checks and balances (CB), government fragmentation (GF ),
and inflation targeting (IT ) as instruments for the respective fiscal rule; p-values for
heteroskedasticity-robust Hausman test and heteroskedasticity-robust test for overi-
dentifying restrictions (OID) in parenthesis. IQual denotes instrument quality and
reports the F -statistic of excluding the instruments from the first-stage regression.
The R2 is calculated as squared correlation between actual and predicted values.
Table 4: Robustness
Fiscal balance BR IQual OID obs GI IQual OID obs
Baseline (see Table 2) 3.652∗∗∗ 24.317 (0.488) 785 3.697∗∗∗ 39.358 (0.584) 785
(1.064) (1.037)
Excluding outliers 2.877∗∗∗ 21.83 (0.981) 748 2.912∗∗∗ 34.576 (0.905) 746
(0.878) (0.858)
|Fiscal balance| < 7% 2.974∗∗∗ 19.817 (0.499) 705 2.784∗∗∗ 33.232 (0.271) 705
(0.918) (0.839)
IV: IT 3.951∗∗∗ 69.205 785 3.966∗∗∗ 98.564 785
(1.158) (1.118)
IV: CB,GF 2.297 8.243 (0.286) 785 2.554 14.509 (0.416) 785
(1.861) (1.695)
IV: CB,GF,GC 1.409∗∗ 20.695 (0.540) 215 1.491∗∗ 26.014 (0.372) 215
(0.572) (0.676)
Short-run spread BR GI
Baseline (see Table 3) -9.566∗∗∗ 19.380 (0.928) 477 -9.261∗∗∗ 26.522 (0.258) 477
(2.065) (2.033)
Excluding outliers -7.829∗∗∗ 20.853 (0.782) 465 -9.240∗∗∗ 25.815 (0.248) 457
(1.692) (1.757)
|Short-run spread| < 9% -4.576∗∗∗ 13.221 (0.804) 437 -4.257∗∗∗ 24.026 (0.349) 437
(1.191) (1.332)
IV: IT -9.864∗∗∗ 45.887 477 -10.758∗∗∗ 53.614 477
(2.446) (2.600)
IV: CB,GF -8.661∗∗∗ 10.602 (0.928) 477 -6.950∗∗∗ 21.295 (0.322) 477
(2.860) (2.134)
Long-run spread BR GI
Baseline (see Table 3) -4.353∗∗∗ 30.417 (0.201) 604 -4.750∗∗∗ 38.159 (0.174) 604
(0.956) (1.064)
Excluding outliers -3.635∗∗∗ 26.378 (0.800) 575 -3.876∗∗∗ 33.656 (0.778) 575
(0.666) (0.761)
|Long-run spread| < 5% -2.352∗∗∗ 21.421 (0.263) 569 -2.407∗∗∗ 30.077 (0.313) 569
(0.574) (0.608)
IV: IT -5.215∗∗∗ 69.368 604 -5.708∗∗∗ 176.701 604
(0.971) (1.119)
IV: CB,GF -2.389 15.643 (0.505) 604 -2.668∗ 21.157 (0.674) 604
(1.508) (1.489)
Notes: Dependent variable is the fiscal balance (upper panel), the short-run inter-
est rate spread (middle panel) and the long-run interest rate spread (lower panel).
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance
at 10, 5, and 1 percent. p-values for heteroskedasticity-robust test for overidentifying
restrictions (OID) in parenthesis. IQual denotes instrument quality and reports the F -
statistic of excluding the instruments from the first-stage regression. For each dependent
variable, five estimation results are reported: i) Baseline estimates from Tables 2 and 3; ii)
Estimates based on sample excluding outliers, defined as observations with a standardized
residual larger than two. iii) Estimates based on sample excluding observations where
the (absolute) value of the dependent variable exceeds twice its standard deviation, i.e.,
7% for fiscal balance, 9% for short-run spread, 5% for long-run spread; iv) Only inflation
targeting (IT ) is used as instrument; v) Only checks and balances (CB) and government
fragmentation (GF ) (and government confidence (GC)) are used as instruments.
Table 5: Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Volatility, and Output Volatility
BR BR BR CB,GF, IT DR GI GI
Dependent variable is output volatility (lnσY ), 2SLS estimates
ln(σFP ) 0.454
∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗ 0.789∗∗ 1.229 0.956∗∗∗ 1.283∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.533) (0.312) (1.349) (0.285) (0.428)
Fiscal rule −1.493∗ −0.534
(0.837) (0.661)
ln GDPPC −0.057 0.072 0.294 0.176 0.352 0.243∗∗ 0.262∗
(0.067) (0.061) (0.215) (0.130) (0.552) (0.120) (0.147)
Hausman (0.189) (0.731) (0.168) (0.296) (0.494) (0.034) (0.013)
OID (0.480) (0.500) (0.503)
IQual 3.267 2.521 3.035 2.459 0.421 8.367 5.309
R2 0.136 0.409 0.367 0.384 0.360 0.374 0.386
SEE 0.523 0.412 0.533 0.445 0.589 0.490 0.555
Dependent variable is fiscal policy volatility (lnσFP ), first-stage regressions (LS)
Fiscal rule −0.537∗ −0.261 −1.354∗∗∗ −1.008∗∗
(0.287) (0.314) (0.440) (0.424)
ln GDPPC −0.371∗∗∗ −0.394∗∗∗ −0.319∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.047) (0.054) (0.052)
R2 0.144 0.118 0.185 0.182
SEE 0.561 0.571 0.542 0.507
Dependent variable is fiscal policy volatility (lnσFP ), 2SLS estimates
Fiscal rule −2.040∗∗ −2.417 −3.772∗∗ −2.946∗
(0.935) (1.540) (1.519) (1.571)
ln GDPPC −0.288∗∗∗ −0.344∗∗∗ −0.174 −0.136
(0.080) (0.065) (0.113) (0.110)
Hausman (0.042) (0.023) (0.050) (0.686)
OID (0.358) (0.520) (0.771) (0.136)
IQual 3.266 3.294 2.864 2.864
R2 0.167 0.106 0.225 0.225
SEE 0.648 0.677 0.636 0.572
Notes: All specifications are based on a cross-section of 74 countries and include a constant.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at
10, 5, and 1 percent. 2SLS estimates using as instrument for fiscal volatility the variable
given in the first line of the table, i.e., the respective fiscal rule (BR,DR,GI) or – in the
fourth column – the institutional variables (CB,GF, IT ). The last column in upper panel
uses as dependent variable a cyclically adjusted measure of fiscal policy volatility (see page
14). 2SLS estimates in lower panel use CB, GF , and IT as instruments for the respective
fiscal rule; p-values for heteroskedasticity-robust Hausman test and test for overidentifying
restrictions (OID) in parentheses. IQual denotes instrument quality and reports the F -
statistic of excluding the instruments from the first-stage regression. The R2 is calculated
as squared correlation between actual and predicted values.
